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Abstract 
 
In this paper we provide a new 31 year time series of the level of protection in the 
Australian Manufacturing Sector.  The index used is the partial equilibrium form of 
the Trade Restrictiveness Index recently developed by the World Bank.  This is the 
theoretically correct welfare-based average of levels of nominal protection provided 
to sub-industries.  The paper outlines the index and its properties.  The method of 
calculation uses series of the mean level of protection and its dispersion, which 
have been published by the Productivity Commission.  Some comments are made 
on the insights gained from the new series.   3
A Trade Restrictiveness Index of the Level of Protection 
in Australian Manufacturing 
 
1. Introduction 
Australia is better served with estimates of the levels of protection of import-
competing producers than any other country.  Since 1968-69 the Tariff Board and 
its successor authorities have provided annual estimates of the average level of 
nominal and effective assistance received by producers.  These now give us a time 
series covering over 35 years. 
 
Recent developments in international trade theory have indicated that the indices 
that have been used are not theoretically correct.  Anderson and Neary (1994 and 
2005) showed that the correct measure of the welfare costs of assistance measures is 
the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI).  The TRI is the uniform (nominal) tariff 
which yields the same utility as the differentiated structure of tariffs and other 
measures.  This index of the average level of trade restrictions is a true (utility-
constant) index and a general equilibrium measure which takes account of all 
relationships across markets in both demand and supply, including input-output 
relations.   
 
However, this measure requires a computable general equilibrium model for each 
year in the series and, since we do not have a sequence of cge models over time, a 
time series is not feasible.  More recently, a group of economists at the World Bank 
have shown how a partial equilibrium form of the TRI can be used to calculate 
estimates of the TRI (Kee, Nicita and Olearraga, forthcoming, a and b).  Irwin   4
(2007) has used this method to calculate a time series of the average tariff for the 
US economy over the period 1859 to 1961. 
 
In this paper we use the partial equilibrium form of the TRI to recompute the time 
series of the average levels of nominal assistance going to producers in the 
Manufacturing Sector of Australia over the period 1973-74 to 2003-04.  The 
Manufacturing Sector is used because it is the import-competing sector with only a 
small proportion of its output exported and its imports account for 90-95 per cent of 
total imports over the period.  Section 2 outlines the TRI index and its properties.  
Section 3 reports the new estimates of the average level of nominal assistance in the 
Manufacturing Sector and Section 4 comments on the insights from the new series. 
 
2. The Trade Restrictiveness Index 
The conception by Anderson and Neary of the TRI was a major breakthrough in the 
theory of tariffs.  In fact, the index is a weighted arithmetic mean of the tariff rates 
with the weights being the marginal welfare losses associated with a change in the 
tariff on each good.    An increase in the index implies a loss of welfare.  It provided 
the welfare-based index that international economists had long been seeking.   
 
A second breakthrough was made with the development of the partial equilibrium 
form of the index by Feenstra (1995).  It is the special case of the TRI in which all 
cross-price effects are zero and the import demand functions, as functions of own 
price alone, are linear.  This index can also be derived form partial equilibrium 
theory (see Lloyd and MacLaren, 2007).  In this paper, only those features of the   5
index which are needed for the calculation of the series are provided.  Anderson and 
Neary (2005) give a full treatment of the general equilibrium form of the TRI. 
 
While the TRI index was devised to measure the restrictiveness of distortions in the 
whole import-competing sector, it can equally be used to measure the 
restrictiveness of distortions in any sub-sector, say, import-competing 
manufactures.  In this case, it is the uniform (nominal) tariff rate which yields the 
same utility as restrictions in this sub-sector, holding constant all restrictions in 
other sectors.  In this paper, we apply the index in this way. 
 
In the case of zero cross-price effects, the TRI reduces to the simple form  
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i indexes the goods subject to tariff distortions.   are the nominal ad valorem rates 
of tariffs, pi
* are the world prices and mi are the import demand functions.    are 
the weights attached to the square of the tariff rate for each good.  They are 
proportional to the marginal responses of imports to changes in prices and the 
associated loss of welfare.  The derivation and properties of this index are discussed 




To make the index operational, it is usual to rewrite the weights as  
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i ε  (< 0) are the elasticities of the import demand function in the free trade situation.  
** ( ii p m  are the values of imports in the free trade situation.  Alternatively, it is 
possible to rewrite the weights in terms of the elasticities and the values of imports   6
in the protected trade situation.  Using the relation between the domestic price and 
the world price to the world price, 
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, and the definition of the 
elasticities, the weights in Equation (1) can be rewritten as 
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Here εi and (pi
*mi) are the elasticities and the values of imports in the protected 
trade situation (at world prices).  This expression for the weights has the 
considerable advantage that the import values are the observed values.   
 
The restriction on the import functions eliminates all cross-market demand and 
supply effects of tariffs.  In particular, it leaves out all input-output relations that go 
into calculations of effective rates.  This is a serious limitation
1 but it gives us an 
index which can be calculated without the use of a cge model and a times series of 
the protection (assistance).  Using the weights in Equation (3), all of the data 
required for calculation of this form of the TRI is readily available. 
 
This index is in fact the mean of order two, not the arithmetic mean (which is the 
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The reason for using the mean of order two stems from the welfare economics of 
tariffs.  For each good, the welfare loss from the imposition of a tariff is the area of 
the triangle under the (income-compensated) income demand function.   The loss 
from a tariff is proportional to the square of the tariff rate.  This holds because the 
tariff rate determines both the price change and the quantity response to this change. 
   7
The index can readily incorporate non-tariff measures (ntms).  For those goods which 
are protected by an ntm or ntms (and possibly a tariff), we need the welfare-equivalent 
tariff rate, ti
E.  This is the ad valorem rate which would yield the same loss as the 
measure or combination of measures.  As one example, suppose a good is assisted 
only by an output-based subsidy.  Then the welfare-equivalent rate will be less than 
the price-equivalent rate (= the ad valorem subsidy rate).  If, further, the domestic 
demand and supply curves have the same slope (ignoring sign), the welfare-equivalent 
rate is 0.71 (=√(1/2)) of the subsidy rate.  As a second example, suppose a good is 
assisted by a combination of a 20 per cent tariff and a subsidy of 20 per cent in ad 
valorem terms.  The consumer price increases by 20 per cent and the producer price 
by 40 per cent. If, again, the domestic demand and supply curves have the same slope, 
the welfare-equivalent rate is 31.2 per cent.  (This the equal-weighted mean of order 
two of the changes in the consumer and producer prices, .)
1/2 22 {0.5 0.5 } (0.2) (0.4) +
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Similarly, for a good subject to a prohibitive tariff or a prohibitive level of some ntm, 
the prohibitive tariff rate, ti
†, is entered.  This is the tariff rate which would eliminate 
all imports. 
 
Equation (1) can now be read with the tariff rates being ti in the case of a good 
protected solely by a tariff, or ti
E in the case of a good protected by one or more 
measures or ti
† in the case of a good protected by a prohibitive tariff or ntm, as 
appropriate.  
 
One further property of the index is required for our calculations.  Following Kee, 
Nicita and Olarreaga (forthcoming b, Equation (29)
3, we can regard the square of   8
the TRI as the product of the two jointly distributed “random variables”, t
2 and   
with observed values ti
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are the trade shares, with the observed protected trade quantities valued at world 
prices, multiplied by a tariff factor.  Taking the expectation of this function and 
using the definition of the covariance and variance, we have  
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This gives us the important result that the TRI is an increasing function of the 
arithmetic mean (using vi as weights) and the variance of the tariff rates and the 
covariance between the elasticities and the squares of the tariff rates.   
 
The expression in Equation (5) requires that we know the elasticities of the import 
demand functions.  If these are not known, we can make the assumption that they 
are all equal.   In this case, the weights reduce to  
** * [ () / ( 1 ) ] () / [ () / ( 1
n
i ii i ii ii i
i
w pm t pm pm t =+ ∑  
Now, 
   (6) 
22 2 2
1




Tt w E t E t V a r
=
== = + ∑
T
2 is the statistic known as the mean square and T is its square root.  The covariance 
term is now zero. 
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Noting that Var[t] ≥ 0, 
T > E[t]  iff Var[t] >0. 
The expression in Equation (6) shows that the uniform tariff is an increasing 
function of the variance and of the arithmetic mean (using wi as weights) of the 
tariff rates.  This is an important result.  The variance captures the role of spikes and 
peaks in the tariff rates.  The Tariff Board and its successors have been aware that 
variation around the average of the nominal and effective rates of assistance 
imposes additional costs on the economy.  This is known in Australia as the 
“disparities” issue.  “The larger the disparities in effective assistance levels, the 
greater the potential for resources to be used in activities which do not maximise 
economic welfare.” (Industry Commission, 1995, p. 39)  Hitherto, it did not know, 
however, how to combine these “disparities” with the measures of the average.   
 
The expression in Equation (6) provides an intuitive explanation of why it is 
necessary to measure tariffs at the level of the tariff line and not at a more aggregate 
level.    It also gives us an expression which can be used to calculate the partial 
equilibrium form of the TRI when the arithmetic mean and variance of the tariff 
rates are known.  
 
3. The New Estimates 
Equation (6) provides a form of the partial equilibrium TRI that can be used to 
construct a series of the average level of assistance to producers in the 
Manufacturing Sector in Australia.  The measure is 
   (7) 
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The Tariff Board and its successor authorities have complied annual estimates of the 
rates of assistance received by Australian manufacturers since 1968-69.  The relevant 
series is the “Average nominal rates of assistance on outputs, manufacturing 
industries”.  These estimates are made at the 4-digit level of the ASIC code and 
aggregated to the 2-digit Manufacturing Sub-divisions and then to the Total 
Manufacturing level.
4  The coverage of measures is broad.  In addition to all tariffs, 
the estimates include assistance provided by all major non-tariff measures when 
applied – including quantitative import restrictions, production subsidies, local 
content schemes and certain export incentives – but there were some exclusions in 
this sector such as, all assistance provided by Commonwealth, State and local 
authorities through budgetary outlays and tax expenditures (see, for example, Industry 
Commission, 1995, chapter 2).  They have also made estimates of the sector-wide 
mean and standard deviation of these covered measures.   
 
Table 1 provides the Tariff Board/IAC/IC/PC estimates of the mean and standard 
deviation of the assistance to producers in the Manufacturing Sector from 1968-69 to 
2003-04.  No estimates of the variance or standard deviation were reported by the 
Tariff Board for the years 1969-70 to 1972-73.  This gives us a 31 year series of the 
mean and standard deviation for the Manufacturing Sector from 1973-74 to 2003-04.  
An estimate of the partial equilibrium TRI, using the index in Equation (6), for this 
period is provided in Table 2. 
 
This series of the TRI departs from the theoretically correct TRI in two respects.  
First, the conversions of the ntms to ad valorem rates are the usual price equivalent ad 
valorem rates, that is, the percentage change in producer prices.  However, they   11
should be welfare-equivalent tariff rates.  In the case of quantitative restrictions these 
are the same.  But in the case of subsidies, which have a direct effect only on the 
supply side of the market with zero effect on the demand side of the market, the 
welfare-equivalent rate is less than the price-equivalent rate (= the ad valorem subsidy 
rate), as noted above.  This imparts an upward bias to the estimates of the average 
nominal rates and the TRI.  Second, in calculating the nominal rates of assistance the 
authorities have used (protected situation) production weights (FOB value of outputs) 
(Industry Commission, 1995, p. 49) whereas the TRI calls for import weights.  It is 
not possible to assess the bias due to this weighting.     
 
However, the bias due to the combined effects of these procedures is likely to be 
small.  The first factor is more important because the mean of order two is more 
sensitive to errors in the rates of distortions than to errors in the weights (see Lloyd 
and MacLaren, 2007).  Indeed, partially differentiating T with respect to εi and then 
, one finds that the elasticity of T with respect to   is two times that with respect to 
.  However, the upward bias due to the incorrect use of price-equivalent tariff rates 
rather than welfare-equivalent tariff rates is small as estimates by the Industry 
Commission/Productivity Commission show that about 90 per cent of the assistance 
to producers comes from tariffs.  The resulting TRI estimates are good estimates and 
much better than those available for any other country, especially with respect to the 
coverage of ntms and the fact that the tariff equivalents have been estimated directly 





The series of the arithmetic mean and the TRI measures of average nominal assistance 
are graphed in Figure 1.  The mean level of assistance to the sector is the series of   12
average nominal assistance to outputs calculated by the authorities.  The TRI is the 
series we have calculated.  Both series show the breaks due to the changes in the 
methods used by the authorities to make estimates of assistance. 
 
Comparison of the arithmetic mean with the TRI shows the effect of moving from a 
mean of order 1 to a mean of order 2.  As expected (from Equation (7)), the TRI series 
lies above the series for the average nominal rate of assistance on outputs.  It also 
exhibits a more pronounced rise in the early eighties.    This was due to an increase in 
the variance during that period.  The TRI has declined more rapidly than the mean 
since the mid-eighties, indicating a more rapid gain in welfare than that suggested by 
the series of the mean.  
 
4. Insights from the New Index 
There are insights to be drawn from these new estimates.  First, the measures of the 
average levels of assistance commonly cited, though admirable by comparison with 
those available anywhere else, are misleading.  They under-estimate the average 
levels considerably.  This is due to the neglect of the “power of two”, the higher 
welfare costs of high and peak levels of assistance of Australian manufacturers.  
 
Second, the measures used in the past have not identified very clearly the turning 
points of the series.  From the point of view of public policy, perhaps the critical 
question is when did the series peak?  The previous series of average rate of 
assistance to manufacturers shows an almost uninterrupted decline since the series 
began in 1968-69 (Table 1).  The preferable TRI series, however, rose clearly over the 
period from 1974-75 to 1982-83.  The reason for this difference is that the average   13
level declined during this period but the variance increased.  This divergence in the 
direction of change in the arithmetic mean and the variance reflects the ambiguity of 
assistance policy during this period, with some rates being increased and some 
decreased.  The TRI series has declined steadily from 1982-83. 
 
The third important issue is the influence of political parties on assistance reform.  
Since at least the Nineties both the Coalition Government and the then Labor 
opposition have been committed to further reforms, with the occasional backsliding, 
chiefly in the TCF and Automotive industries.  During the Seventies and the first 
half of the Eighties, however, all Australian governments were uncertain about the 
direction of change of industry assistance.  The TRI series actually peaks in the last 
years of the Fraser Government.  It has declined steadily since 1983-84, despite the 
introduction of the Button Plans for the automotive and TCF industries in 1985 and 
1986 and some associated increases in tariff rates and ntms in these industries (see 
Productivity Commission, 2003, Appendix E).  
 
Finally, these insights indicate that there would be high returns on more research 
into the TRI for Australia.  The figures in Table 2 should be regarded as preliminary 
estimates.   They have taken advantage of the estimates of the mean and variance of 
levels of assistance that the Productivity Commission has already published.  These 
estimates could be refined by calculating the TRI directly from Equation (1) with 
the weights in Equation (3).  This would require making calculations of the 
consumer tax rates implied by tariffs and ntms, using import weights rather than 
production weights and possibly using estimates of import elasticities.  The 
Productivity Commission already has the data needed to calculate the consumer tax   14
rates.  The Productivity Commission has had to make annual estimates of nominal 
and effective rates of assistance.  Calculating the TRIs is a natural extension of this 
programme.  Similarly, they could calculate TRIs for the Agricultural sector and for 
all imports combined.   15
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Figure 1:  Average Nominal Rate of Assistance to Australian Manufacturing, 1973-74 














































































































































































































































Note:  a The upper series is the TRI and the lower one the arithmetic mean.  Neither 
series is continuous because the Productivity Commission has revised the base period 
from time to time.  These base periods are provided in Table 1.   18
Table 1:  The Mean and Standard Deviation of Nominal Rates of Assistance to Australian Manufacturing 
  Average Nominal Rates  Standard Deviation of the Nominal Rates 
Year  71-72 74-75 77-78 83-84 89-90 96-97 71-72 74-75 77-78 83-84 89-90 96-97 
1 9 6   8 - 6 9 2 4              
1 9 6   9 - 7 0 2 3              
1 9 7   0 - 7 1 2 3              
1 9 7   1 - 7 2 2 2              
1 9 7   2 - 7 3 2 2              
1973-74  17        11       
1974-75    15        12      
1975-76    16        13      
1976-77    15        14      
1977-78    15  15       15  15     
1978-79     15        15     
1979-80     15        16     
1980-81     15        17     
1981-82     16        18       19
1982-83     16  13       19     
1983-84      13        20    
1984-85      13        17    
1985-86      12        13    
1986-87      12        13    
1987-88      11        13    
1987-89      10        12    
1989-90      9  9        12   
1990-91      9  8        11   
1 9 9   1 - 9 2 8 9                 
1 9 9   2 - 9 3 7 8                 
1 9 9   3 - 9 4 6 6                 
1 9 9   4 - 9 5 5 5                 
1 9 9   5 - 9 6 5 5                 
1996-97       4  3.5       4  4 
1997-98        3.3        4 
1997-99        3.2        3 
1999-00        3.0        3   20
2000-01        2.8        3 
2001-02        2.8        3 
2002-03        2.8        3 
2003-04        2.8        3 
 
   21
 
Table 2:  The TRI for the Australian Manufacturing Sector, 1973-74 to 2003-04 
  Average Nominal Rates  TRI 
Year  71-72 74-75 77-78 83-84 89-90 96-97 71-72  74-75  77-78  83-84  89-90 96-97 
1973-74  17        20          
1974-75    15        19        
1975-76    16        21        
1976-77    15        21        
1977-78   15  15           21       
1978-79     15         21      
1979-80     15         22      
1980-81     15         23      
1981-82     16         24      
1982-83     16  13         25       
1983-84      13          24    
1984-85      13          21    
1985-86      12          18      22
1986-87      12          18    
1987-88      11          17    
1987-89      10          16    
1989-90        9  9        15   
1990-91        9  8        14   
1991-92       8           12   
1992-93       7           11   
1993-94       6          8  
1994-95       5          7  
1995-96       5          7  
1996-97       4  3.5         6  
1997-98        3.3           5 
1997-99        3.2           4 
1999-00        3.0           4 
2000-01        2.8           4 
2001-02        2.8           4 
2002-03        2.8           4 
2003-04        2.8           4   23




1 The partial equilibrium TRI may be an over-estimate or an under-estimate of the general equilibrium form (see Lloyd and MacLaren, 2007). 
 
2 These calculations of the welfare-equivalent rates are made by setting the area of the welfare triangle with an ntm or a combination of measures equal to the area of the 
triangle with an ad valorem tariff and solving for the tariff rate.  
 
3 Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (forthcoming b) derive the expression for the partial equilibrium form of the TRI which uses the free trade weights but the same algebra applies to 
the expression using the distorted situation weights.  
 
4 The series are reported for separate sub-periods.  There are minor differences in the methods used to make the estimates for each sub-period.  